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Properties of group safety climate in construction: The development and evaluation of a typology 
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School of Property, Construction and Project Management, RMIT University. 
 
ABSTRACT 
A safety climate survey was conducted in three Australian construction industry organizations. Workers’ perceptions of their 
supervisors’ safety response (SSR) and coworkers’ safety response (CSR) were measured as facets of group safety climate. A 
two dimensional schema was developed based upon the strength and the level of group safety climate. The resulting 
framework was used to position the forty workgroups included in the sample within one of four group safety climate types. A 
non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test revealed that workgroups in which members share a strong consensus that coworkers 
should treat safety as a priority had a significantly lower injury frequency rate than other workgroups in the sample. While no 
significant differences between the injury frequency rates of workgroups positioned in the four safety climate types were found 
for the other facets of group safety climate, workgroups with strong and high (i.e., strongly supportive) safety climates related 
to supervisors’ safety expectations and coworkers’ actual safety behaviour reported injury frequency rates on average two 
thirds the magnitude of the remaining workgroups in the sample. Although limited by the reliance on retrospective and 
insensitive measurement for the dependent variable (i.e., injury frequency rates), the research provides preliminary evidence 
for the importance of considering both the strength and level of group safety climates in the construction industry. Future 
research should seek to replicate and extend this research by examining the antecedents of group safety climate strength and 
level in the construction context. 
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Introduction 
 
Safety climate 
Neal and Griffin (2006: pp 946-947) define safety climate as ‘individual perceptions of the policies, 
procedures and practices relating to safety in the workplace.’ Safety climate is believed to shape workers’ 
behaviour through the expectations they form about how organizations value and reward safety (Zohar & 
Luria, 2005). A great deal of interest has been given to the extent to which safety climate predicts safety 
performance within organizations (Cooper & Phillips 2004). There is considerable evidence that strong 
and positive safety climates are linked to higher levels of safety performance. For example, Tharaldsen, 
Olsen and Rundmo (2008) report a significant inverse correlation between safety climate perceptions and 
accident rates in the offshore industry, while Mearns, Whitaker and Flin (2003) showed that offshore 
installations returning a lower proportion of self-reported accidents were characterized by more 
favourable safety climates. Varonen and Mattila (2000) report safety climate to be inversely correlated 
with the accident rate in wood processing companies and, in the Australian health sector, Neal and Griffin 
(2006) report that safety climate measured at one point in time positively predicted subsequent safety 
motivation and self-reported safety-related behaviour. Clarke (2006) conducted a comprehensive meta-
analysis of safety climate research and reports a consistent positive link between safety climate and safety 
performance in prospective studies (i.e. those in which safety performance was monitored after the 
measurement of safety climate was undertaken).  
 
Safety climate in construction 
Safety climate has been examined in the construction industry. For example, Dedobbeleer & Beland, 
(1991) report that, in construction, perceptions of management commitment to safety and workers’ 
involvement in on-site safety are important facets of safety climate. This finding has been supported by 
more recent research in the Hong Kong construction industry, with Choudhry, Fang and Lingard (2009) 
identifying management commitment and worker involvement as important facets of a construction 
organization’s safety climate. Fang, Yang & Wong (2006) also examined the factor structure of safety 
climate in the Hong Kong construction industry and reported significant differences in perception of the 
safety climate by age. Consistent with research in other industries, there is empirical evidence to support a 
positive link between safety climate and the safety performance of construction organizations (Gillen, 
Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch & Vaccaro, 2002). In Hong Kong, Siu, Phillips and Leung (2004) measured how 
construction workers perceived the safety responses of themselves, their colleagues, management, 
company safety officers and their supervisors, reporting that aggregated safety climate scores were 
inversely related to self-reported injury rate. Zhou, Fang and Wang (2008) report that two climate 
dimensions (management commitment and workmates’ influence) exert significantly greater influence on 
self-reported safety behavior than workers’ personal experiences of training and safety in the Hong Kong 
construction context. Similarly, In a lagged, two-wave study of Swedish construction workers, Poussette, 
Larsson, and Törner (2008) report that safety climate scores at one point in time significantly predicted 
self-reported safety behaviours seven months later (after controlling for safety behaviour at time one).  
 
Group-level safety climates 
The majority of safety climate studies have focused on the organization as the unit of analysis. However, 
Zohar (2000) proposed two levels of safety climate: (i) that arising from the formal organization-wide 
policies and procedures established by top management; and (ii) that arising from the safety practices 
associated with the implementation of company policies and procedures within workgroups. Zohar tested 
this proposition in a manufacturing context and confirmed that workgroup members develop a shared set 
of perceptions of supervisory safety practices, and discriminate between perceptions of the organization’s 
safety climate and the workgroup safety climate. Zohar suggests that the prevailing group safety climate 
relates to patterns of supervisory safety practices, or ways in which organization level policies are 
implemented within each workgroup or sub-unit. In support of this, Johnson (2007) revealed that 
perceptions of supervisors’ safety actions predicted safety behaviour and the occurrence of incidents in 
the manufacturing sector. 
 
Recent analyses of group level safety climate have extended Zohar’s focus on the behavioural patterns of 
supervisors and to consider the perceptions of coworkers’ responses to safety. For example, Melia, 
Mearns, Silva and Lima (2008) report that perceptions of supervisors’ safety response was strongly linked 
to organizational safety response and perceptions of coworkers’ safety response was linked to workers’ 
individual safety response in independent Chinese and Spanish construction samples. There is evidence 
that supervisors and coworkers have an important influence on safety climate and outcomes in the 
construction context. For example, Choudhry and Fang (2008) report that when coworkers’ and 
supervisors’ are perceived to be unsupportive of safety, construction workers are more likely to adopt 
unsafe work practices. 
 
Arguably, the group safety climate should be a stronger predictor of safety performance than organization 
level safety climate, especially in large organizations, because most workers have little contact with top 
management and are more likely to be influenced on a day-to-day basis by interactions with members of 
their immediate workgroup, including the supervisor and coworkers. The strength of group-level 
influences on safety was highlighted by a study of macro- (organizational) and micro- (group level) 
factors on workers’ safety performance conducted by Simard and Marchand (1994).  In this research, 
supervisory practices were reported to be the strongest predictor of workgroups’ propensity to take safety 
initiatives (Simard & Marchand 1995) and to comply with safety rules (Simard & Marchand 1997). The 
effect of workgroup and supervisory practices were considerably higher than macro- (organizational) 
factors, such as top management commitment to safety espoused by organizational safety policies. 
Further, Simard and Marchand (1995) found that these macro- (organization-level) factors influenced 
workers’ safety behavior indirectly via group-level safety factors. This finding is consistent with the 
assertion of Christian, Bradley, Wallace and Burke (2009) that proximal antecedents of safety 
performance will have a stronger influence than distal antecedents. 
 
Safety climate research 
Most researchers have measured safety climate at the level of the organization. Zohar and Tenne-Gazit 
(2008) describe how, in the measurement of safety climate, individual climate scores are aggregated to 
the unit of analysis of theoretical interest. This can be the entire organization or organizational sub-units, 
such as workgroups. Safety climate researchers have often incorporated coworker safety behaviour and 
supervisory safety leadership in their survey design. For example, Lu and Shang (2005) incorporate both 
perceptions of co-worker safety and perceptions of supervisors’ safety leadership in a safety climate 
survey of container terminal operators in Taiwan and Fang et al. (2006) identified supervisors’ and 
workmates’ role  as the third most important component of safety climate in the Hong Kong construction 
context. However, these researchers all aggregated these scores to the level of the entire organization. 
With regard to supervisory and coworker facets of safety climate, the workgroup is a more appropriate 
unit of analysis. Attempts to aggregate scores for these dimensions at the organization level are likely to 
mask important between-group differences, such as those identified by Findley, Smith, Gorksi and O’Neil 
(2007) in their analysis of workers in the nuclear decommissioning and demolition industry. 
 
There is emerging evidence that distinct group-level safety climates develop within construction 
organizations. For example, Glendon and Lutherland (2001) reported significant between-group 
differences in safety climate within an Australian road construction and maintenance organization. 
Lingard, Cooke and Blismas (2009) report significant between-group variance and within-group 
homogeneity in group-level safety climate perceptions in the Australian construction context. Thus, the 
two criteria established by Zohar as requisite indicators of group-level climate were met. In construction 
there is likely to be a particularly strong connection between group level safety climate and safety 
performance due to the multi-tiered subcontracting system and prevalence of semi-autonomous 
workgroups. In this context, the influence of immediate supervisors and coworkers is likely to be strong, 
relative to that of senior management. Consistent with the view that group level safety climate is likely to 
be a stronger, more proximal, predictor of safety performance than organizational safety climate, group 
safety climate has also been found to mediate the relationship between organizational safety climate and 
the injury frequency rate of subcontracted work groups in the Australian construction industry (Lingard, 
Cooke & Blismas, in press). 
 
Safety climate properties 
In this research we sought to develop a typology for the classification of group safety climates. We have 
developed a two-dimensional schema in which group safety climates can be positioned according to their 
properties of strength and level. This is an important extension of previous analyses of safety climate in 
the construction industry that have focused on safety climate level, without due consideration of the 
important property of safety climate strength. Zohar and Luria (2004) suggest that safety climates can be 
described in terms of two parameters: (i) their strength; and (ii) their level.  Safety climate strength refers 
to the degree of consensus concerning climate perceptions within members of a group and can range from 
weak to strong.  A strong safety climate is one in which there is very high consensus between members 
about the priority placed upon safety, while a weak safety climate is where there is a low level of 
consensus concerning commitment to safety.  The level of safety climate refers to the relative priority 
placed upon safety within a workgroup as perceived by members of that group.  The level of the safety 
climate can be expressed as either high (i.e., perceptions of a high level of safety commitment) or low (i.e. 
perceptions of low safety commitment).  Thus, it is possible for a safety climate that is supportive of 
safety (i.e., high in level) to be either weak or strong depending upon the degree of ‘sharedness’ of this 
perception among workers in the same workgroup. 
 
Figure 1 suggests four theoretically distinct types of safety climate positioned according to their strength 
and level. These are: 
(i) An indifferent safety climate (weak strength and low level); 
(ii) An obstructive safety climate (strong strength and low level); 
(iii) A contradictory climate (weak strength and high level); and 
(iv) A strongly supportive climate (strong strength and high level). 
 
Figure 1: Safety climate types 
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In an ‘indifferent’ safety climate, group members (including supervisors) are perceived to be low in 
commitment to and ambivalent towards safety.  A characteristic of this type of safety climate is a low 
level of consensus as to the relative priority placed upon safety within the workgroup. An ‘obstructive’ 
safety climate is characterised by a strong consensus that safety is of secondary importance to other facets 
of work performance, such as production among group members (including supervisors).  A 
‘contradictory’ safety climate can develop when mixed messages concerning the importance of safety are 
communicated and/or where group members’ (including supervisors’) actions are inconsistent with their 
rhetoric regarding the importance of safety.  In these circumstances, weak consensus about the relative 
priority of safety exists, despite a perception that group members pay ‘lip service’ to safety matters.  
Finally, in a ‘strongly supportive’ safety climate, group members (including supervisors) are perceived to 
consistently treat safety as being of high priority and demonstrate a high level of commitment to safety, 
which does not vary according to circumstances.  
 
Aims and objectives 
This research examines the nature of two distinct properties of group safety climate in the construction 
context, namely: (i) group climate level; and (ii) group climate strength. A framework for positioning 
group-level safety climates in a two-dimensional grid representing these two properties is developed, The 
group safety climates of 40 work groups from three Australian construction organizations are analysed to 
answer the following research questions: 
(1) What is the relationship between the strength and level of safety climate within workgroups? 
(2) Are safety climate strength and/or level related to the injury frequency rate of workgroups? and 
(3) Do workgroups of different safety climate ‘types’ experience significantly different injury 
frequency rates?  
 
Research methods 
 
Data collection sites 
Data were collected within three organizations operating in the Australian construction industry. Prior to 
the commencement of data collection, workers were advised that participation was voluntary and that 
their responses would be anonymous. No inducements were given to participants. In all three 
organizations the majority of participants were union members, although union density was not measured 
in the research and could not be controlled for in the group-level analyses. 
 
Study one was undertaken within the regional construction and maintenance works district of a state-
based road construction and maintenance organization in the Southeast of Australia. Four work centres 
make up the works district. Each work centre consists of a number of work crews. Paper-based 
questionnaires were administered during work hours. A member of the research team visited worksites 
within the region to distribute and collect the surveys. Workers not available during the survey 
administration were invited to complete the questionnaire at a later date. Surveys completed after the 
researcher’s visit to the organization’s worksites were placed in self-sealed envelopes and returned 
directly to the research team, via the Regional Site Safety Coordinator. 
 
Study two was undertaken at a hospital construction project in Melbourne, Victoria. Surveys were 
administered using the ‘TurningPoint’ automated response system with ‘KeyPad’ hand-held devices. The 
use of this system helps to overcome issues of literacy as survey questions are projected onto a screen and 
read out by the researcher. The response system can be set so that if a respondent presses an ‘out of range’ 
value (for example six), the response is not accepted. The researcher can monitor responses to determine 
completeness of data as it is being collected. The advantages of this system include the completeness of 
data and minimisation of human error in data entry (de Quiros, Lopez, Aranda-Mena, & Edwards, 2008). 
Participants were invited, by the principal contractor’s site safety coordinator to participate in the survey 
during normal work hours. Surveys were completed in the site office. 
 
Study three was undertaken at the Melbourne operations of a national steel reinforcement manufacturing 
organization, engaged in off-site manufacture of steel construction products. Data were collected from 
sixteen workgroups across four sites in metropolitan Melbourne. As in study two, surveys were 
administered using the ‘TurningPoint’ automated response system with ‘KeyPad’ hand-held devices. 
Workers unable to complete the initial survey were invited to complete a paper-based version of the 
questionnaire at a later date. Surveys completed after the researcher’s visit to the organization’s worksites 
were placed in self-sealed envelopes and returned directly to the research team, via the National Manager 
- Partnering. 
 
Data collection instrument 
Coworkers’ Safety Response (CSR) was measured using questions from two sources. Five items were 
adopted from Burt, Sepie, & McFadden’s considerate and responsible employee (CARE) scale (Burt et al. 
2008). Example items are “Coworkers should be warned when their actions are unsafe,” and “Workers 
should assist each other with tasks to ensure safety.” The remaining ten questions, which also measured 
coworkers’ safety response, were adopted from the UK Health and Safety Executive Safety Climate 
Survey (HSE 2002).  Example items are “My workmates encourage others to be safe” and “Some of my 
team pay little attention to health and safety” (reverse scored). All items were rated by respondents using 
a five point Likert scale ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). Supervisors’ Safety 
Response (SSR) was measured using an eleven-item group safety climate scale developed by Zohar 
(2000).  Example items are “Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor wants us to work faster, rather 
than by the safe work procedures” (reverse scored), and “My immediate supervisor often talks to me 
about health and safety.”  Participants were asked to rate all of the statements in the survey on a five point 
scale, ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (5). A complete list of survey items is 
available upon request from the corresponding author. 
 
The dependent variable, i.e., injury frequency rate, was a combination of the workgroup lost time and 
medical treatment injury frequency rates for the twelve months prior to conducting the survey in each 
organization. This data was obtained from company records. Each individual respondent was assigned the 
injury frequency rate score for the workgroup in which they were situated.  
 
Data analysis 
The factor structure of both the CSR and SSR scales was examined using principal components analysis 
with varimax rotation. This technique is used to reduce a large number of survey items to a set of 
coherent subscales, which can be used in further statistical analysis. The internal consistency reliability of 
the group safety climate components was then assessed using Cronbach’s alpha. Consistent with Zohar 
and Luria (2004), the strength of group climate was the within-group homgeneity for each climate 
dimension measured using the inter-rater agreement (IRA) method. The IRA is used to measure the 
interchangeability or the absolute consensus in scores between group members.  It estimates whether 
responses from one participant are ‘similar’ to the responses provided by others in the same workgroup, 
thus reflecting the degree of ‘sharedness’ in group climate scores (James, Demaree & Wolf. 1993). When 
all workers within the same workgroup are in perfect agreement, they assign the same rating to the target, 
the observed variance among judges is zero, and rWG =1:0.  In contrast, when workers are in total lack of 
agreement, the observed variance results in rWG approaching 0.0.  It is possible to obtain out-of-range 
values (i.e., values less than 0 or greater than 1). In this event, an interrater agreement score of zero is 
allocated to that group to indicate a complete lack of agreement (Le Breton & Senter, 2008; James, 
Demaree & Wolf, 1984).The climate level for each dimension was the mean score for all items loading on 
this dimension across the workgroup (Zohar & Luria, 2004).  
 
Owing to the fact that scores were not normally distributed, non-parametric (Spearman rho) rank 
correlation analyses were used to ascertain the relationship between group climate level and strength and 
group injury frequency rates. The position of the 40 workgroups was plotted on a two-dimensional grid, 
representing the parameters of climate strength and level and a median-split method was used to position 
groups in the hypothetical quadrants, each representing a safety climate ‘type.’ A median split is one 
method for turning a continuous variable into a categorical one. Using this method, any value below the 
median is considered low and any value above the median is considered high. The median split method is 
the most frequently used approach to defining thresholds in quadrant analysis because it is unaffected by 
outliers and creates relative (rather than extreme) groups (Churchill, 1999; Lund, 2003).  In the present 
analysis, the median split method was selected for use because no established ‘norm’ scores exist for 
group level safety climate strength and level, upon which to base thresholds. Also, the safety climate 
typology was being evaluated in the Australian context and it was necessary to relatively position 
workgroups within this context.  
 
Workgroups were coded, according to climate type, for each dimension of group safety climate measured. 
Non-parametric (Kruskal Wallis) tests were conducted to ascertain whether significant differences exist 
between the injury frequency rates of workgroups in the four identified ‘types.’  
 
 
Results 
 
The sample 
A total of 307 surveys were received from the three organizations.  The breakdown of respondents and 
workgroups is summarised in Table 1. Seventy one useable responses (23.1%) were received from the 
state road construction and maintenance organization. Ninety nine (32.2%) useable responses were 
received from the hospital construction project and one hundred and thirty seven (44.6%) responses were 
received from the steel reinforcement manufacturing organization. 
 
Table 1:  Responses and workgroups by organization 
Organization No. of responses No. of  
workgroups 
Road construction and maintenance 
organization 
71 15 
Hospital construction project 99 9 
National steel reinforcement 
manufacturing organization 
137 16 
 
Principal components analysis (PCA) 
An initial unforced PCA of the SSR scales yielded three components with eigenvalues exceeding one. 
These components explained 40.87%, 11.28%, and 9.34% of the variance respectively. The retention of 
of components with eigenvalues greater than one is one technique for determining the structure of a scale, 
also known as using the Kaiser criterion. However, Pallant (2005) explains that researchers must 
ultimately determine the number of components to retain in a PCA and that this decision must balance the 
need to find a simple solution (i.e., a minimum number of components) with the need to ensure that the 
resulting component model explains as much variance in the dataset as possible. Indeed, Tabachnick and 
Fiddell (2001) suggest that researchers explore different component structures until a satisfactory solution 
is found. Consequently, two other techniques were used to identify the number of components to retain in 
the analysis. First, the scree polt was examined. The scree plot shows the eigenvalues for components in 
diminishing order of magnitude. Inspection of the plot shows the point at which the curve changes 
direction and becomes horizontal. The point at which the curve ‘elbow’ occurs indicates the appropriate 
number of components (Catell, 1966). The scree plot for the SSR scale indicated a two component 
solution, which was further supported by the results of parallel analysis. In parallel analysis, the size of 
eigenvalues obtained is compared to those obtained using a randomly generated dataset of the same size. 
Only those components with eigenvalues greater than the values obtained using the random dataset are 
retained (Horn, 1965). The parallel analysis of the SSR scale showed only two factors with eigenvalues 
exceeding the corresponding values for a randomly generated data matrix of the same size (10 x 307). 
Pallant (2005) argues that parallel analysis is preferable to the use of the Kaiser criterion in determining 
the number of components to retain as the latter method tends to overestimate the number of components. 
 
The two components explained 52.15% of the overall variance with component one explaining 40.87% 
and component two explaining 11.28% respectively. There was no double-loading of items and all item 
loadings were greater than 0.40. Zohar’s original Group Safety Climate (GSC) scale yielded two distinct 
factors representing supervisors’ actions and supervisors’ expectations. According to Zohar (2000) action 
refers to the ‘overt supervisory reaction to subordinates' conduct (i.e., positive and negative feedback) and 
the initiation of action concerning safety issues’ (p. 591), while expectation refers to ‘supervisory 
expectation and gives priority to noncommensurate task facets, mostly safety versus productivity.’ (p.591). 
 
An examination of the items indicated that their loadings were consistent with the original 
conceptualisation of group safety climate developed by Zohar (2000). Thus, the components were 
labelled ‘supervisors’ safety actions’ and ‘supervisors’ safety expectations’ respectively. Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficients for supervisors’ safety actions and supervisors’ safety expectations were .80 and .71 
respectively, indicating acceptable internal consistency reliability. 
 
An initial unforced PCA of the CSR subscale revealed the presence of three factors with eigenvalues 
exceeding one, explaining 30.6%, 18.5% and 7.4% of the variance respectively.  However, an inspection 
of the scree plot revealed a clear break after the second component.  A two factor structure was further 
supported by the results of Horn’s parallel analysis (see above), which showed only two factors with 
eigenvalues exceeding the corresponding criterion values for a randomly generated data matrix of the 
same size (15 x 307).  The two factor solution explained 49.1% of the variance, with factor one 
contributing 30.6% and factor two contributing 18.5%. All items loaded clearly one or other of the two 
factors. There was no double-loading of items and all item loadings were greater than the threshold value 
of 0.40. An examination of the wording of these items revealed an interesting conceptual distinction. 
Items loading on the first component reflected the actual safety behaviour of respondents’ coworkers, 
while items loading on the second component reflected how coworkers should ideally behave in relation 
to safety. Thus, the factors were labeled ‘coworkers’ actual safety behaviour’ and ‘coworkers’ ideal safety 
behaviour’ and treated as separate variables in further analysis. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for 
‘coworkers’ actual safety behaviour’ and ‘coworkers’ ideal safety behaviour’ were 0.85 and 0.80 
respectively, indicating acceptably high internal consistency reliability. Further details relating the PCAs 
can be obtained from the first-named author. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
A series of quadrant charts was plotted to position each workgroup’s safety climate in the two 
dimensional schema described above.  The calculated values are shown for each workgroup with the 
values for climate strength abscissa (horizontal axis) and for climate level on the ordinate (vertical axis). 
The diagrams are divided into four quadrants according to the median values for strength and level of 
safety climate (solid lines). Figures 2 and 3 show the distribution of workgroups according to perceptions 
of Supervisors’ Safety Response and Figures 4 and 5 show workgroups distributed according to 
perceptions of Coworkers’ Safety Response.  
 
Figure 2 shows the quadrant plot for supervisors’ safety expectations. The majority of workgroups fell 
into either the ‘strongly supportive’ (n=14, 35%) or ‘indifferent’ (n=14, 35%) quadrants with regard to 
this dimension of group safety climate. However, six of the workgroups (15%) were positioned in the 
‘obstructing’ quadrant, indicating that there was a high degree of consensus that safety is not always a 
high priority for their supervisor in these workgroups. Another six workgroups (15%) were positioned in 
the ‘contradictory – mixed messages’ quadrant, indicating that, on average, workers in these groups 
perceive their supervisor to have high expectations for safety but that these workgroups do not have a 
strong consensus concerning members’ perceptions of their supervisors’ safety expectations. 
 
Figure 3 shows the quadrant plot for supervisors’ safety actions. Again, the majority of workgroups fell 
into either the ‘strongly supportive’ (n=14, 35%) or ‘indifferent’ (N=14, 35%) quadrants with regard to 
this dimension of group safety climate. However, six workgroups (15%) fell into the ‘obstructing’ 
quadrant, indicating that there was a high degree of consensus about supervisors’ safety-related behaviour 
but that the supervisor was perceived to be relatively low in support for safety.  Six workgroups (15%) 
were also positioned in the ‘contradictory – mixed messages’ quadrant, indicating that, on average, 
workers in these groups perceive their supervisor to behave in a way that is supportive of safety, workers 
in these workgroups do not have a high degree of consensus in members’ perceptions of supervisors’ 
safety actions.  
 
Figure 2: Quadrant plot of supervisors’ safety expectation by workgroup 
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Figure 3: Quadrant plot of supervisors’ safety actions by workgroup 
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Figure 4 shows the quadrant plot for coworkers’ actual safety behaviour. Sixteen (40%) of workgroups 
were positioned in the ‘indifferent’ quadrant for this dimension of group safety climate, indicating a 
degree of perceived ambivalence towards safety among their coworkers. However, a similarly large 
proportion (n=15, 37.5) of workgroups were positioned in the ‘strongly supportive’ quadrant for this 
dimension. Four workgroups (10%) fell into the ‘contradictory – mixed messages’ quadrant and another 
five (12.5%) were located in the ‘obstructive’ quadrant. 
 
Figure 5 shows the quadrant plot for coworkers’ ideal safety behaviour. The 40 workgroups are clustered 
very close together in the top right hand corner in this chart, indicating a tendency for workgroups to 
demonstrate high strength and level in relation to this dimension of group safety climate. However, 
relative to the median scores, only six workgroups (15%) fell into the ‘strongly supportive’ quadrant, with 
14 (35%) falling into the ‘indifferent’ and 13 (32.5%) falling into the ‘contradictory – mixed messages’ 
quadrants respectively. Seven workgroups (17.5) were positioned in the ‘obstructive’ quadrant for this 
dimension of group safety climate. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Quadrant plot of coworkers’ actual safety behaviour by workgroup 
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Figure 5: Quadrant plot of coworkers’ ideal safety behaviour by workgroup 
Coworkers' Ideal Safety Behaviour
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Strength
L
e
v
e
l
Organisation 1
Organisation 2
Organisation 3
Non-parametric correlation analysis 
Table 3 shows the non-parametric (Spearman rho) correlation coefficients for the two parameters of each 
of the four dimensions of group safety climate and the group injury frequency rate. Strength and level of 
group safety climate were strongly positively correlated with one another for supervisors’ safety 
expectations (rho=.503, p=.001), supervisors’ safety actions (rho=.492, p=.001) and coworkers’ actual 
safety behaviours (rho=.616, p=000). There were also significant relationships between the various facets 
of group climate. The level of supervisors’ safety expectation was significantly positively correlated with 
the level of supervisors’ safety action (rho=.663, p=.000) and the level of coworkers’ actual safety 
behaviour (rho=.545, p=.000). The only facet of group safety climate that was significantly correlated 
with workgroup injury frequency rate was coworkers’ ideal safety behaviour. The strength, but not the 
level, of this dimension of group safety climate was significantly negatively correlated with workgroup 
injury frequency rate (rho-.445, p=.004). 
 
Table 2: Spearman rho correlation coefficients for the strength and level of the safety climate dimensions and workgroup injury frequency rate 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Supervisors’ safety expectations (strength) rho 1.000         
p .         
2. Supervisors’ safety expectations (level) rho .503** 1.000        
p .001 .        
3. Supervisors’ safety actions (strength) rho .597** .444** 1.000       
p .000 .004 .       
4. Supervisors’ safety actions (level) rho .401* .663** .492** 1.000      
p .010 .000 .001 .      
5. Coworkers’ actual safety behaviour (strength) rho .218 .421** .590** .491** 1.000     
p .177 .007 .000 .001 .     
6. Coworkers’ actual safety behaviour (level) rho .198 .545** .168 .459** .616** 1.000    
p .220 .000 .300 .003 .000 .    
7. Coworkers’ ideal safety behaviour (strength) rho .278 .103 .243 .203 .354* .104 1.000   
p .082 .526 .131 .210 .025 .522 .   
8. Coworkers’ ideal safety behaviour (level) rho -.047 .004 -.096 .101 -.223 -.107 .161 1.000  
p .771 .979 .557 .536 .167 .510 .320 .  
9. Workgroup injury frequency rate rho -.081 -.121 .009 -.175 -.069 -.027 -.445
**
 -.039 1.000 
p .621 .456 .958 .281 .674 .868 .004 .809 . 
Note: p<=.001 was interpreted as a very strong correlation and p<=0.01 was interpreted as a strong correlation.  
 
 
 
Kruskal Wallis analyses 
Each workgroup was coded according to its position in the four quadrant schema. Coding was as follows. 
‘1’= ‘indifferent’; ‘2’= ‘contradictory’; ‘3’ = ‘obstructive’ and ‘4’= ‘strongly supportive’ group safety 
climates. A series of Kruskal Wallis tests were then performed to test for significant differences in injury 
frequency rate between workgroups positioned in different quadrants or types for each of the four 
dimensions of group safety climate. The results are shown in Table 3. No significant differences between 
the injury frequency rate of workgroups positioned in the four types were found for supervisors’ safety 
expectation, supervisors’ safety action or coworkers’ actual safety behaviour. However, the injury 
frequency rates of workgroups falling into different quadrants in relation to perceptions of coworkers’ 
ideal safety behaviour differed significantly. In particular, workgroups demonstrating high strength and 
high level for this dimension of group safety climate reported a higher injury frequency rate than 
workgroups falling into other safety climate types. 
 
Table 3: Mean injury frequency rate comparison between workgroups of different climate types 
Climate type SSR (expectation) SSR (action) CSR (actual safety 
behaviour) 
CSR (Ideal safety 
behaviour) 
 N Mean Mean 
rank 
N Mean Mean 
rank 
N Mean Mean 
rank 
N Mean Mean 
rank 
Indifferent 14 324.55 20.93 14 307.58 20.21 16 315.16 20.56 14 368.78 23.68 
Contradictory 6 330.18 23.25 6 142.03 13.67 4 357.30 24.25 13 400.35 26.12 
Obstructive 6 340.11 22.67 6 366.20 24.33 5 340.84 24.70 7 138.80 13.86 
Strongly 
supportive 
14 215.78 17.96 14 302.21 22.01 15 227.36 18.03 6 41.22 8.67 
 Chi-square = 1.234 
Significance=  .745 
Chi-square = 3.00 
Significance=  .391 
Chi-square = 1.752 
Significance=  .626 
Chi-square = 12.633 
Significance=  .006 
Note:  The injury frequency rate is defined as the combined lost time and medical treatment injury rate per million 
manhours worked. 
 
Discussion 
 
Relationship between group safety climate strength and level 
The strong correlation between strength and level values for three of the four group safety climate 
dimensions (supervisors’ safety expectation, supervisors’ safety action and coworkers’ actual safety 
behaviour) indicates a tendency for group safety climates to be either low and weak or high and strong. 
This is consistent with the finding that for ‘supervisors’ safety expectations,’ ‘supervisors’ safety actions’ 
and ‘coworkers’ actual safety behaviour’ the majority of the 40 workgroups included in the analysis were 
positioned in the strongly supportive (high level and strong strength) and indifferent (low level and weak 
strength) quadrants of the two dimensional schema.  It is noteworthy that the spread of datapoints was 
substantially smaller in the case of ‘coworkers’ ideal safety behaviour’ (Figure 5) than other dimensions 
of group safety climate (Figures 2-4). For this dimension of group safety climate, with the exception of 
one workgroup, the workgroups were clustered much closer to the top right corner of the scatterplot, 
indicating a strong degree of consensus that coworkers should be highly supportive of the safety of other 
group members. The consistently strong and high perceptions of ‘coworkers’ ideal safety behaviour’ are 
in contrast to the more diverse perceptions of the other three dimensions of group safety climate which 
were not so closely grouped in the top right hand quadrant.  
 
However, this was not the case for all workgroups, some of which were characterised by a strong group 
consensus but a relative low level of commitment to safety (i.e., an obstructive group safety climate) or 
relatively weak group consensus and a high mean group safety climate score (i.e., a contradictory or 
‘mixed messages’ group safety climate).  
 
It is not clear what contributes to the development of strength and level in group safety climates, but this 
is an area in which future research could be directed and theory developed and tested. It is noteworthy 
that a number of workgroups in the analysis exhibited no group consensus (i.e, had a safety climate 
strength value of zero). Factors contributing to the development of ‘sharedness’ of perceptions of safety 
within workgroups should be explored in future safety climate research, particularly in the context of 
construction workgroups whose membership may be relatively unstable over time. Zohar and Luria 
(2004) suggest supervisory behaviours associated with group safety climate strength and level include: (i) 
pattern orientation, defined as the extent to which the pattern of supervisory actions suggest the priority of 
one role facet over another (e.g. safety over production); (ii) pattern variability, defined as the extent to 
which similar events or situations elicit similar supervisory actions in terms of relative priorities ; and (iii) 
pattern simplicity, defined as the number of situational contingencies or attributes incorporated into 
supervisors’ behavioural patterns. According to Zohar and Luria (2004), pattern orientation should predict 
group safety climate level, while pattern variability and simplicity should predict safety climate strength, 
because pattern simplicity and variability relate to the ease and consistency with which subordinates will 
detect patterns in supervisory behaviour.  
 
Relationship between group safety climate strength and level and group injury frequency rates 
Contrary to the findings of previous research, that have found group safety climate to be inversely 
correlated with rates of injury, the level of all four dimensions of group safety climate was unrelated to 
workgroup injury frequency rate. With the exception of coworkers’ ideal safety behaviour, the strength of 
group safety climate was also unrelated to workgroup injury frequency rate. The absence of a significant 
negative correlation between group safety climate level and workgroup injury rates may be due, in part, to 
limitations inherent in the way in which safety performance was measured in this research. Lost time and 
medical treatment injury rates may not be a sufficiently sensitive measure of safety performance at a 
workgroup level. Reportable injuries are statistically rare events and may not be a useful measure of 
subtle changes in safety performance at the level of the workgroup. Hopkins (2009) writes of the ‘zoom 
effect,’ whereby serious incidents may occur too infrequently to be a useful measure of safety at the 
company or workplace level. Hopkins suggests that where harmful events are rare, a more frequently 
occurring indicator of safety performance is needed.  It is possible that at the level of the workgroup, lost 
time and medical treatment injury rates are too infrequent to be a useful measure of safety performance 
due to the ‘zoom effect.’ Thus further research should be conducted to examine the relationship between 
group safety climate and injury rates using a more fine-grained measure of workgroup safety 
performance, such as micro-accidents or minor (non-reportable) injuries (Zohar 2000, Zohar 2002). 
 
Another methodological factor that may have contributed to the absence of a significant correlation 
between workgroup injury frequency rate and group safety climate level is the fact that our injury data 
were retrospective, i.e., reflected workgroup injury performance before the administration of the safety 
climate survey. Safety climate is theoretically positioned as an antecedent (rather than a consequence) of 
safety performance. Consistent with this, Clarke (2006) reported safety climate to predict safety 
performance in prospective studies, i.e. those in which safety performance is measured after the 
administration of a climate survey, but found no consistent relationship in retrospective studies. Thus, the 
timing of safety performance measurement relative to the timing of safety climate surveys may be critical. 
If safety performance is a consequence of safety climate, then research designs should measure safety 
performance for a period after the administration of a safety climate survey. Unfortunately, the reliance 
upon retrospective data in our research is a serious limitation and further research with prospective 
designs is recommended to examine the relationship between group safety climate level and safety 
performance in the construction industry.  
 
However, in our research, the strength of coworkers’ ideal safety behaviour was significantly inversely 
correlated with injury frequency rate. Thus, the more frequently workers were injured in the 12 month 
period prior to the administration of the survey, the lower was the level of consensus between workgroup 
members as to how coworkers should ideally behave in relation to safety. This was unexpected and the 
reason for this inverse correlation is unclear. More research is recommended to test whether this 
relationship can be generalised. 
 
Safety climate type and injury frequency 
With the exception of coworkers’ ideal safety behaviour, no statistically significant differences were 
found between the injury frequency rates of workgroups falling within the different quadrants of the two-
dimensional schema. For both supervisors’ safety expectation and coworkers’ actual safety behaviour, the 
injury frequency rates of workgroups falling in the strongly supportive quadrant were considerably lower 
than those of workgroups positioned in the other three quadrants, i.e. workgroups positioned in the 
strongly supportive quadrant reported injury frequency rates in the 200s, while workgroups in all of the 
other quadrants reported injury frequency rates in the 300s per million manhours. However, the Kruskal 
Wallis analysis revealed that this difference was not statistically significant. Apart from the 
methodological limitations associated with the use of retrospective injury data noted above, it is also 
possible that the small sample size (N=40 workgroups) contributed to the failure to find a statistically 
significant difference between the injury frequency rate among workgroups whose group safety climate 
strength and level positioned them in different quadrants of the two dimensional schema. Further research 
with larger sample size and prospective micro-injury data is recommended. 
 
Conclusions 
The new theoretical development we present has important implications for researchers as it moves the 
study of safety climate beyond a simple analysis of level to incorporate the important dimension of 
strength. While shared perceptions of safety are an almost universally accepted defining feature of safety 
climate within organizations, very little research actually treats the degree of ‘sharedness’ of these 
perceptions as being a property of safety climate worthy of analysis. The present research provides 
preliminary evidence for the usefulness of understanding group safety climates in the construction 
industry in terms of both their level and strength. However, although strength and level were significantly 
correlated, a number of workgroups in the analysis manifested strong consensus that safety was of 
relatively low priority or a relatively weak consensus that safety is a high priority. These findings suggest 
that to understand the concept of group safety climate, more research is needed to examine the 
antecedents and outcomes of group safety climate strength and level. 
 
It is essential that the theoretical two-dimensional model should be subject to further testing, critical 
review and development. If supported in further empirical analyses, the two dimensional safety climate 
model potentially has important implications for construction organizations and managers. In particular it 
suggests a need to focus upon communicating the importance of and setting high expectations for safety, 
while also developing strong consensus within workgroups about the importance of safety relative to 
other project objectives. It is probably important to better understand the impact of management actions 
on both the level and strength of safety climates. This understanding will assist construction organizations 
to foster the development of workgroup climates characterised by a strong consensus that safety is a high 
priority (i.e., strongly supportive group safety climates). 
 
Although the research revealed that the workgroups with a ‘strongly supportive’ group safety climate for 
supervisors’ safety expectation and coworkers’ actual safety experienced injury frequency rates that were 
approximately two thirds the magnitude of workgroups with ‘indifferent,’ ‘contradictory – mixed 
messages’ or ‘obstructive’ group safety climates, these differences were not statistically significant. 
Notwithstanding the lack of statistical significance, the findings provide some preliminary evidence that 
the development of ‘strongly supportive’ group safety climates should be encouraged within the 
construction industry. 
 
Limitations and future research 
In this research the median-split method was used for defining the threshold values for the ‘safety climate 
type’ quadrants. However, the context in which the research took place, i.e. the Australian construction is 
characterised by relatively well developed safety management systems and a high degree of worker 
engagement in safety processes. Consequently, the safety climate strength and level scores for the 
majority of workgroups fell above the mid-point values for the respective Likert scales used in the data 
collection scales (i.e., 3.0 for level and 0.5 for strength). This ‘clustering’ of scores at the upper end of the 
strength and level values could have contributed to the lack of significant difference in injury frequency 
rate between groups positioned in the four quadrants. The median split method selected for use could 
have forced groups with strong and positive safety climates into the indifferent, contradictory or 
obstructive quadrants arbitrarily, effectively ‘diluting’ differences in objective safety performance. It is 
recommended that future research test the proposed model of safety climate using more diverse samples, 
i.e. workgroups with more variability on strength and climate scores, as well as using different methods 
for defining quadrant thresholds. In particular, the impact of choice of method for defining thresholds in 
quadrant analyses of this type is an important empirical question worthy of further research. 
 
The research was substantially limited by the reliance upon reportable lost time and medical treatment 
injury rates as the measure of workgroup safety performance and the retrospective nature of injury data 
available. The ‘zoom effect’ and relative infrequency of these events could explain the failure to find a 
consistent and significant relationship between perceptions of group safety climate workgroup safety 
performance. Future research, using prospective designs and more sensitive measures of workgroup 
safety performance are needed. 
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